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The Ethics of Willful Ignorance
REBECCA RoIPHE*

In general,courts, legislatures,and regulatorsdo not excuse individuals,including
lawyers,from legal obligationsbecause they turned a blind eye to the underlyingfacts.
By defining knowledge as "actualknowledge," the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, however, allow lawyers to avoid responsibilitiesto the community and the
public by remaining ignorant of relevant facts. For example, lawyers do not face
disciplinary chargesfor assisting in clientfraudas long as they avoid information that
might lead them to know about the criminalconduct. David Luban, one of the leading
scholars in the field, has defended the ABA 's approach,arguing that lawyers must be
allowed to avoid the truth to protect the lawyer-client relationship. This Article
questions Luban 's thesis. Tolerating willful ignorance not only undermines the rules
that protect the public, but also conflicts with the premises of the attorney-client
relationship.By defining knowledge as actual knowledge, the ethical rules promote
duties to the public on the surface while allowing lawyers to ignore them in reality,
which reinforcesa sense that the responsibilityto the community and the rules designed
to enforce it are merely ornamental. Furthermore, this definition of knowledge
underminesthe efficacy of the attorney-clientrelationshipby subtlypromoting afailure
ofcommunicationand abortedinvestigations.As embodied in the rules ofconfidentiality and privilege, the lawyer's access to all relevant information is necessary to
represent the client well. The tacit approval of willful ignorance conflicts with such
informed representation.ThisArticle argues that the Model Rules ought to require all
lawyers to pursue importantand obvious facts and directly addressthe properbalance
between the lawyers'loyalty to the client and obligationto the public with regardto the
substantive rules in the context of diferent areasofpractice.
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INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, scholars have asked whether lawyers
might have played a more active role in preventing the collapse.' They have
revisited with a new urgency the question of whether lawyers ought to serve as
gatekeepers, monitoring the legality of their clients' actions. 2 One issue central to
this recurrent concern is whether we should excuse lawyers for ignoring
suspicious facts that would trigger either reporting obligations or the need for

1. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: The Role of Lawyers in the Global FinancialCrisis, 24 AusTL.
J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1532794
(hereinafter KeynoteAddress); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Public Responsibility ofStructured FinanceLawyers, 1
CAP. MARKETs L. J. 6 (2006); Andreas Bohrer, The Impact of the FinancialCrisis on the Law and the Legal
Profession (2009 Int'l Junior Faculty Forum, Harvard Law Sch. & Stanford Law Sch., 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1511323.
2. See sources cited supra note 1. The literature on lawyers' role as gatekeepers is enormous. See, e.g., John
C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failureand Reform: The Challenges of FashioningRelevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L.
REv. 301 (2004); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the
Regulation of FinancialInstitutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019 (1993); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The
Anatomy of a Third-PartyStrategy, 2 J. L. EcON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
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further investigation.3
Like most corporate scandals, the now infamous story of Enron's demise has,
among other things, the character of the attorney who facilitates the wrongdoing,
in part, by remaining ignorant of its most grisly aspect. Sherron Watkins, a vice
president for corporate development at Enron, warned chairman Kenneth Lay
that the company was engaged in a series of accounting frauds so severe that the
entire enterprise was at risk. Before the collapse, Watkins told Lay that with
Arthur Andersen's help, Enron had manufactured investment deals designed to
keep massive amounts of debt off the books and falsely inflate the company's
earnings. Lay engaged the law firm Vinson & Elkins, which had been involved in
the underlying transactions, to review the limited partnership deals but specifically instructed the attorneys not to look into Arthur Andersen's treatment of
them. The law firm reported back that the transactions looked fine because the
accountants had signed off on them. Lawyers from Vinson & Elkins interviewed
seven senior executives, who were themselves implicated in Watkins' allegations,
and did not interview any of the lower level employees who had been identified
as potential witnesses to the problem. With blinders on, the attorneys continued
on course.4
Much has been written on the notion of "conscious avoidance," or "willful
ignorance" in criminal law. 5 In essence, the criminal law doctrine dictates that
someone who deliberately ignores obvious facts is as culpable as a person who
knows those facts but continues despite them.6 Most courts and regulators adhere

3. Schwarcz, Keynote Address, supra note 1, at 11-13.
4. Roger C. Crampton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 Bus.
LAW. 143, 162-64 (2002); Robert W. Gordon, A New Rolefor Lawyers: The Corporate CounselorAfterEnron,
35 CoNN. L. REv. 1185, 187-88 (2003); Milton C. Regan, Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1230-32
(2005); William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective
Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5-8 (2005). David Luban uses an earlier example: In the OPM case, a law
firm represented a client who was defrauding the bank of billions of dollars. When presented with a letter
containing information about the fraud from the client's accountant, the lawyer asked the accountant to take the
letter back before he had read it. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 209 (2007).

5. Like most of the literature, this Article uses the terms "conscious avoidance" and "willful ignorance"
interchangeably.
6. The pattern jury instruction reads as follows:
In determining whether the defendant acted knowingly, you may consider whether the defendant
deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. If you find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with . .. a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth ...
then this element may be satisfied. However, guilty knowledge may not be established by
demonstrating that the defendant was merely negligent, foolish or mistaken ... . If you find that the
defendant was aware of a high probability that (e.g., the statement was false) and that the defendant
acted with deliberate disregard of the facts, you may find that the defendant acted knowingly.
However, if you find that the defendant actually believed that (e.g., the statement was true), he may
not be convicted. It is entirely up to you whether you find that the defendant deliberately closed his
eyes and any inferences to be drawn from the evidence on this issue.
MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL

§ 3A-5.
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to some version of the same standard in civil securities fraud cases as well.7 Thus,
courts and regulators do not allow individuals-including lawyers-to ignore
obvious facts when doing so would make them participants in criminal conduct.
The ethical rules, however, hold lawyers to a lower standard. Under the current
rules, a lawyer acts knowingly when he has "actual knowledge of the fact in
question." The Model Rules qualify that "knowledge may be inferred from the
circumstances." 8 Deliberately turning a blind eye to relevant facts, however,
would not meet the mens rea requirement under this standard.
Professor David Luban, a preeminent professional ethics scholar, defends the
bar's position with regard to willful ignorance by emphasizing how crucial this
game of denial is to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. According to
Luban, clients would grow to distrust lawyers if they pursued information
harmful to the clients' interest.9 This argument overlooks the bar's own
conviction, embraced in the ethical rules and elsewhere, that communication,
knowledge, and truthfulness are the cornerstone of a productive attorney-client
relationship.o By condoning willful ignorance, the bar cannot possibly preserve
the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship because it simultaneously undermines communication, which, in other contexts, it has proclaimed to be the
essence of that relationship.
Lawyer-philosophers have spent many pages considering the value of the
willful ignorance doctrine. Is it fair to punish someone who didn't know what he
was doing, even if his ignorance was a product of his own mental gymnastics?
Isn't this the same as punishing a person for what he should have known-a
negligence standard generally inapplicable in criminal law? Perhaps, the Model
Penal Code explains, we should simply assert that someone who is aware of the
high probability of a fact is deemed to know that fact." Despite disagreement
about the exact form of the test and when it ought to be triggered, the criminal
courts have generally applied some version of the willful ignorance standard. The
bar, however, has remained fairly consistent in its refusal to acknowledge
conscious avoidance as a state of mind that triggers ethical obligations.12

7. See infra Part i.B.
8. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.0(f) (2010) [hereinafter MODEL RuLES].

9. See David Luban, ContrivedIgnorance, 87 GEO. L. J. 957, 976-80 (1999).
10. MODEL RuLEs R. 1.6; ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT TO
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (June 7, 2005), available at www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomeyclient/materials/hod/

report.pdf.
11. Luban, supra note 9, at 959-62; Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Willful Ignorance,Knowledge,
and the "Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study ofthe DeeperSignificance ofthe PrincipleofLegality, 1994 Wisc.
L. REv. 29, 36 (1994); Robin Charlow, Willful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 Tx. L. REv. 1351,
1367-68 (1991); see also Stephen Ellmann, Truth and Consequences, 69 FORDHAM L. Rav. 895 (2000)
(discussing willful ignorance, the confidentiality rules, and the rules forbidding a lawyer from presenting false
testimony in the context of a client interview).
12. Part I of this Article reviews and assesses some of the tests for willful ignorance that have made their way
into the criminal law but remains, for the most part, agnostic about the exact formulation of the test that ought to
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This Article argues that by doing so, the bar has muffled a debate about the
proper balance between the public role of lawyers and their duties to clients. This
is a debate which, given the increasingly diverse profession, ought to take
account of the different work that lawyers do. The actual knowledge requirement
manufactures a semblance of uniformity in legal regulation, masking the truly
contextual nature of legal ethics.' 3 For instance, it allows for one rule against
perjured testimony when most everyone knows that criminal defense lawyers and
civil litigators treat this rule differently.14 Forbidding lawyers from avoiding
ethical obligations by turning a blind eye to obvious facts would force this
conversation about the obligations of lawyers to their clients and the public to the
surface. It would in turn require the profession to examine how this balance might
tip depending on the different practice areas and clients that lawyers represent.
Part I of this Article provides background on the notion of willful ignorance in
criminal law. It explores the literature on the doctrine of willful ignorance as a
criminal mens rea requirement and analyzes how these debates map onto
professional ethics. Because federal criminal law and the law of most states
condemn an individual who willfully avoids obvious and relevant facts, this
section concludes that it makes no sense for ethical rules to treat lawyers with
greater leniency.
Part II addresses Professor Luban's arguments supporting the bar's current
definition of knowledge and shows that they are either illogical or based on
unlikely empirical assumptions. By focusing disproportionately on criminal
defense attorneys, Luban takes insufficient account of the context in which
different lawyers operate. Like the bar, he approves of the willful ignorance
standard because it creates the illusion that all lawyers follow the substantive
ethical requirements equally. In reality, by turning a blind eye to their client's
guilt, most criminal defense attorneys use the actual knowledge standard to abide
by the perjury rules in a superficial and formalistic way at best.
Part III demonstrates that in the context of assisting in client fraud, courts,
legislatures, and regulatory bodies have far higher expectations of lawyers than
the bar, proscribing deliberate blindness to client wrongdoing. This section
demonstrates that by clinging to the actual knowledge standard, the bar is
embracing a particular balance between lawyers' obligations to their clients (or
constituents of their clients) and the public. Rather than doing so in a transparent

be applied to professional ethics. The precise wording of the rule and application of the test would obviously
have to be worked out if the ABA or state courts were to integrate willful ignorance into the mens rea definitions.
13. In making this point throughout this Article, I am indebted to the path breaking insights of Professor
David Wilkins. David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1145, 1152-53 (1993).
14. See MODEL RULEs R. 3.3. Criminal defense lawyers are usually quite liberal in allowing their clients to
testify, even when the testimony is fairly obviously false. Civil litigators are generally more scrupulous,
preventing witnesses from introducing false evidence. This makes some sense given that criminal defendants
have a right to testify on their own behalf while civil litigants have no such right.
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way, however, the actual knowledge standard obscures the fact that the bar has
opted for a client-centered approach, making it seem as if lawyers are equally
concerned with the effect of their actions on the public. This Part of the Article
also highlights the obvious fact that government regulators are increasingly
targeting lawyers by practice area. In what seems a stubborn commitment to a
uniform bar, the ABA resists the sorts of distinctions between practicing lawyers
that are becoming increasingly significant in the regulatory world. By doing so,
this section argues, the bar is at risk of rendering itself obsolete. If it proves
unable to keep pace with the changes in the profession and the regulatory world,
the professional bar might lose its position of influence.
Part IV draws on this discussion to argue that in this context, the bar ought to
embrace a role consistent with the expectations of other regulatory bodies. In
doing so, it concludes that the debate over which body ought to regulate lawyers
is, in fact, a debate over the role of lawyers in the democratic system. By allowing
lawyers to blind themselves to obvious facts, the current ethics code embraces a
uniformly client-centered approach to lawyering while maintaining a cosmetic
commitment to the public and the legal system as a whole. In addition to bringing
the debate to the surface, adopting a willful ignorance standard will encourage
the bar to examine whether this client-centered approach is appropriate in all
practice areas or only in certain contexts.
I. BACKGROUND
A. WILLFUL IGNORANCE IN CRIMINAL LAW

Academics have long debated the wisdom of the willful ignorance standard in
criminal law. Despite the theoretical controversy, most courts apply some version
of this standard in holding individuals and entities criminally liable. Both the
history of the standard and the scholarly debate support the conclusion that the
ethical rules ought to include a willful ignorance standard.
Willful blindness, known at the time as connivance, first surfaced in the
mid-nineteenth century in England. In 1861, a judge in Regina v. Sleep ruled that
the defendant could not be guilty of possessing "naval stores" unless there was
proof that he either knew that the goods were government-owned or "willfully
shut his eyes to the fact."15 This arguably indirect acknowledgment of the willful
ignorance doctrine was followed fourteen years later by a British court, which
explicitly relied on the concept in upholding a conviction of an innkeeper for
knowingly permitting gambling on the premises." The gamblers had corroborated the innkeeper's story that she had no knowledge of what they were doing.

15. 169 REV. REP. 1296, 1302-03 (Q.B. 1861). For a more detailed discussion of the origins of deliberate
ignorance, see J. Edwards, The CriminalDegrees of Knowledge, 17 MOD. L. REv. 294, 297-300 (1954).
16. See Bosley v. Davies, 1 Q.B.D. 84, 85-88 (1875).
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The court upheld the conviction nonetheless, reasoning that "actual knowledge in
the sense of seeing or hearing by the party charged is not necessary, but there
must be some circumstances from which it may be inferred that he or his servants
had connived at what was going on."17
In America at the turn of the nineteenth century, courts invoked the notion of
willful ignorance most frequently in the context of regulatory crimes. For
instance, the court in People v. Glennon reversed the conviction of an officer for
failing to restrain a house of prostitution. The court remanded, directing that the
jury ought to be instructed that the officer could be culpable under the statute if he
knew that it was a brothel or if he failed to investigate clear evidence that the
premises were being used for such illicit purposes.' 8 Professor Robin Charlow
has argued that, as in Glennon, the early American cases tended to equate willful
ignorance with knowledge when there was an independent statutory obligation to
know.' 9 Thus it seems likely that the growing web of regulation and the
accompanying obligations placed on private citizens in the late nineteenth
century provoked a perceived need to expand the definition of knowledge. In
other words, as the regulatory state grew to rely on private citizens' obligations to
each other and the community, the criminal law gradually began to punish
individuals for deliberately ignoring facts that would clearly trigger such
obligations.20
The federal courts similarly adopted the willful ignorance standard in the
beginning of the twentieth century. In 1899, the Supreme Court tacitly approved
the notion in Spurr v. United States.21 The defendant in Spurr,a bank officer, had
been convicted of certifying a check when he knew the drawer lacked sufficient
funds in the account. On appeal, the Court noted that "evil design can be
presumed if the officer purposely keeps himself in ignorance of whether the
drawer has money in the bank or not." 22 While the issue of jury instructions was
not before the Court, the Court did acknowledge the propriety of willful
ignorance as a substitute for the statutory mens rea requirement.
The deliberate ignorance standard gained momentum in the 1970s with the
increase in narcotics prosecutions.2 3 In United States v. Jewell, the leading
federal case involving willful ignorance, Jewell was convicted of importing

17. Id. at 88.
18. People v. Glennon, 67 N.E. 125, 128-29 (N.Y 1903).
19. Charlow, supra note 11, at 1406-07.
20. For a discussion of the emergence of the regulatory state and the changes in the law and culture, see
generally STEVEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEw AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967); RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955).
21. See Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 734-39 (1899).
22. Id. at 735.
23. Kristen L. Chesnut, Comment, United States v. Alvaredo: Reflections on a Jewell, 19 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 47,49 (1989).
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marijuana in a car he was driving from Mexico to the United States.24 At trial, he
testified that he did not know what was in the car. An agent elaborated that Jewell
had admitted that he thought something illegal was likely in the car but that he
had checked the glove compartment and found nothing. The Court approved an
instruction that directed that the jury could convict if it found that the defendant
was unaware of the contraband in the car as long as his ignorance "in that regard
was solely and entirely a result of his having made a conscious purpose to
disregard that which was in the vehicle." 2 5 Federal courts have subsequently
formulated the test slightly differently and disagreed over how readily judges
ought to issue the conscious avoidance jury instruction, but they have universally
adopted some version of the doctrine.26
Scholars of criminal law have long debated the wisdom of holding individuals
criminally liable on evidence that they deliberately ignored relevant facts. Some
note that willful ignorance implies the lack of knowledge. As a result, willful
ignorance and knowledge cannot possibly be the same thing, and a court acts
illegitimately or even unconstitutionally by reading such an opposing term into
the meaning of knowledge.2 7 Others voice the concern that while willful
blindness is not exactly a negligence standard-punishing someone when that
person should have known about certain facts-juries will invariably elide the
two. Negligence implies a duty to know. Certain relationships can impose this
duty in certain circumstances but it defies common sense to assume that everyone
has a duty to know everything at all times such that the deliberate evasion of facts
is culpable.2 8 Thus, even though we do not normally consider negligence a
sufficient state of mind for criminal prosecution, individuals will be convicted for
a negligent failure to investigate.29
The Model Penal Code offers an antidote to these criticisms, phrasing the test
as an affirmative mental state rather than the absence of knowledge.o In other
words, the Model Penal Code equates being aware of the high probability of a
fact with knowledge.31 But, as critics have recognized, the Model Code
formulation does not really approach the same problem as willful ignorance.
Instead, it imposes a lesser mental state somewhat akin to recklessness. 32 Rather

24. United States v. Jewell, 532 U.S. 697, 698 (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
25. Id. at 700.
26. Jonathan L. Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willfid Blindness, 102 YALE L.J. 2231,
2245-49 (1993).
27. Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignoranceas a CriminalMens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L.
AND CRIMINOLOGY 191, 194-227 (1990).
28. LuBAN, supra note 4, at 209-11.
29. Luban, supra note 9, at 959-60.
30. Charlow, supra note 11, at 1394-96; Robbins, supra note 27, at 223-26.
31. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02(7) ("When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an
offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he
actually believes that it does not exist.").
32. Charlow, supra note 11, at 1394-96; Robbins, supra note 27, at 223-26.
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than focus on how deliberate the individual was in avoiding knowledge, the
Model Code simply demotes the requisite mens rea requirement to something
short of actual knowledge. 3
Among the critics of willful ignorance are those who accept the common sense
of some version of the doctrine but argue that the standard ought better suit the
conduct we deem morally culpable.34 For instance, Professor Holly Smith
suggests that the law should focus entirely on how deliberate the individual was
in setting up the screening mechanism to avoid the requisite knowledge. In other
words, courts should focus on the individual's state of mind at the time she
shielded herself from the guilty knowledge rather than her state of mind at the
time of the misdeed. David Luban borrows from Smith's approach but
ultimately departs from her conclusion, suggesting that the jury should look at the
individual's state of mind regarding the misdeed-rather than the defense against
knowledge of the misdeed-at the time that individual chose to shield herself
from guilty knowledge. In other words, Luban argues, if an individual wishes to
commit a crime and hides from reality simply as a means to avoid liability, that
person ought to be held responsible. If, on the other hand, the individual would
not have committed the crime if she had allowed herself to acknowledge the
facts, that person should not be punished.
The courts have all opted for a simpler test-some variant of the Model Penal
Code or the Jewell test-perhaps for ease of application. But there is no reason
Smith and Luban's critique could not be integrated into jury instructions or, in the
context of legal ethics, the comments following the Model Rules. This
commentary seems particularly relevant for charging decisions and the exercises
of discretion that accompany them.

33. Charlow, supra note 11, at 1373-96.
34. See Charlow, supra note 11, at 1413-18 (arguing that willful ignorance should be viewed as a culpable
mental state when an individual deliberately blinds himself to certain facts in order to avoid criminal
punishment); see also Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern:A Unified Conception ofCriminal Culpability, 88
CALIF. L. REv. 931, 932 (2000) (arguing that courts ought to focus on how risky it was for the individual to do
what he did); Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 962-63 (1998)
(arguing that the individual's indifference to the consequences of his acts should dictate his culpability).
35. See Holly Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 PwL. REv. 543, 555-71 (1983).
36. Luban, supra note 9, at 973-74. Luban's proposal is similar to Charlow's in that both suggest looking at
the individual's state of mind with regard to the criminal act at the time that individual shielded herself from
guilty knowledge. In this way, the two scholars depart from both Smith and the Model Penal Code. The Model
PenalCode formulation, which equates willful ignorance and knowledge when an individual is aware of a high
probability of the existence of the underlying fact, ignores the individual's motives for screening herself from
guilty knowledge.
37. Id. at 974-75. For a similar argument, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. Clum. L.
& CRuMINOLOGY 597, 641-52 (2001) (arguing that willful blindness ought to be a culpable state of mind if the
individual would have acted even if he possessed the knowledge to which he willfully blinded himself).
38. See generally Marcus,supra note 26.
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B. WILLFUL IGNORANCE AND ETHICAL STANDARDS
1. THE MEANING OF THE AcTUAL KNOWLEDGE STANDARD
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, like the criminal statutory scheme,
frequently authorize discipline when a lawyer knowingly engages in certain
unethical conduct. For instance, lawyers must not knowingly assist in a crime or
fraud." Lawyers must not knowingly introduce false testimony in court.4
Lawyers for an organization must report up the ladder when they know that an
individual within that entity has committed a crime or fraud that could harm the
institution. In each of these situations, the lawyer may have an incentive to avoid
the knowledge that would require him to act against the wishes of his client (or in
the last example, some constituent of his client). The Rules, however, define
knowledge as "actual knowledge of the fact in question." 41 By defining
knowledge as actual knowledge, the Model Rules contribute to this incentive by
allowing lawyers to turn a blind eye to facts that might trigger these difficult
obligations designed to protect the public or the integrity of the legal system. The
ABA's various interpretations of knowledge in different contexts also illustrate
that the bar is using the mens rea requirement subtly to allow for distinctions
between the responsibilities of different sorts of lawyers engaged in different
sorts of law practice without drawing attention to the disparate treatment under
the rules.
After defining knowledge as "actual knowledge," the Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct do note that "[a] person's knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances."4 2 There are several different ways to interpret this phrase. The
most reasonable, it seems, is that it prescribes an objective standard of proof but
does not change the substantive rule. Thus, the clarification serves as an
admonition to lawyers that a finder-of-fact could ignore a lawyer's subjective
protestations of ignorance if circumstances belie that claim. For instance, under
the Model Rules standard, a lawyer could not hide by insisting that he did not
know that his client was committing a crime if it were obvious from e-mails he
received or documents he reviewed that he actually knew about the unlawful acts.
However, the lawyer would have a successful defense if he did in fact remain
ignorant because he never read certain documents or opened certain e-mails
because he suspected that they might contain evidence of a crime.
An alternate-and less persuasive-way to understand this provision is that it
incorporates willful ignorance into the definition of knowledge. In the context of
the "no-contact" rule, the ABA has, in a somewhat confused iteration, interpreted

39. MODEL RULES R. 1.2(d).

40. MODEL RuLEs R. 3.3(a).
41. MODEL RuLEs R. 1.0(f).
42. Id. In the context of client perjury, the Restatement uses a similar definition of knowledge. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GovERNING LAWYERS

§ 120 cmt. c (2000).
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knowledge to include some version of deliberate ignorance. Rule 4.2 provides
that, in representing a client, a lawyer "shall not communicate about the subject
of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter."4 3 In explaining the scope of this rule, an ABA ethics
opinion explained the meaning of knowledge:
Rule 4.2 does not ... imply a duty to inquire. Nonetheless, it bears emphasis
.that, as stated in the definition of 'knows'. . .actual knowledge may be inferred
from the circumstances. It follows, therefore, that a lawyer may not avoid Rule
4.2's bar against communication with a represented person simply by closing
her eyes to the obvious."
The final inference, which seems to assume the willful ignorance standard,
does not quite follow. The fact that actual knowledge can be inferred from the
circumstances is a standard of proof. Actual knowledge is still the substantive
requirement. Thus, a lawyer who shields himself from facts that clearly indicate
that the other party with whom he speaks was represented by counse'l could not be
sanctioned under the Model Rules. While it might be hard to convince a jury that
the lawyer lacked actual knowledge when most reasonable people would have
known, there exists a set of circumstances on the margin, at least, in which a jury
could believe that the lawyer, who intentionally avoided obvious facts, lacked the
requisite actual knowledge, and therefore ought not to be sanctioned.4 5
In the context of client perjury, the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers confirms this interpretation of the definition of knowledge as actual
knowledge. The comment to the Restatement explains that a lawyer must have
"actual knowledge" and that such knowledge may be inferred from the
circumstances. But, the comment further explains, a lawyer's knowledge may not
be based on "unknown information, even if a reasonable lawyer would have
discovered it through inquiry." In order to "know" that testimony is false, the
defense lawyer will have to know of facts that contradict his client's story or the
client will have to inform him directly that the testimony is false.4 6
Faced with the ambiguity in the language of the Model Rules, some scholars
and courts have interpreted the Model Rules to hold lawyers responsible when
they deliberately ignore relevant facts. For instance, Professor Charles Wolfram
writes:
For the most part, a lawyer is not under an obligation to seek out information.
But, as in the criminal law, a lawyer's studied ignorance of a readily

43. MODEL RuLEs R. 4.2.
44. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995).
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. d (2000) (explaining knowledge as
actual knowledge but noting that a mere denial of knowledge will not suffice since knowledge can be inferred
from the circumstances).
46. Id.
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ascertainable fact by consciously avoiding it is the functional equivalent of
knowledge of the fact .... As a lawyer, one may not avoid the bright light of a
clear fact by averting one's eyes or turning one's back.4 7
A Connecticut ethics opinion citing Wolfram similarly reasoned that a lawyer
must obtain all the information necessary to provide competent advice to the
client. The opinion drew a line very similar to that of the criminal law: Lawyers
are entitled to believe their clients insofar as it is reasonable to do so, but "a
lawyer may not turn a blind eye to the obvious."4 8
There is at least some argument that even with the actual knowledge standard,
by willfully blinding himself to important facts, a lawyer violates other
substantive rules of professional conduct. The rules protecting clients seem to
imply some duty to investigate even if the scope of the obligation is vague. 4 9 The
comments to the rule governing competence provide that "competent handling of
a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal
elements of the problem."50 Arguably, a lawyer cannot comply with his duties of
competence and diligence if he turns a blind eye to important facts. Regardless of

47. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 696 (1986).
48. Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Informal Op. 91-22 (1991); see also In re Dobson, 427 S.E.2d
166, 168 (S.C. 1993) (imposing a two year suspension on a lawyer based in part on the finding that he had
"deliberately evaded knowledge of facts which tended to implicate him in a fraudulent scheme"); Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous, 714 A.2d 402, 407 (Pa. 1992) ("We hold that a culpable mental state
greater than negligence is necessary to establish a prima facie violation of Rule 8.4(c). This requirement is met
where the misrepresentation is knowingly made, or where it is made with reckless ignorance of the truth or
falsity thereof. . .. [R]ecklessness may be described as the deliberate closing of one's eyes to facts that one had
a duty to see or stating as fact, things of which one was ignorant.").
49. Model Rule 1.1 states, "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation." The comment to Model Rule 1.1 further explains, "[c]ompetent handling of a particular matter
includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and ... adequate preparation." See also MODEL RULES R. 1.3 ("A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client
despite opposition, obstruction, or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical
measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."); MODEL RULEs R.
3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent
in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that
every element of the case be established."). In the criminal context, the ABA standards impose a direct
obligation to investigate. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DEFENSE FuNcTION 4-4.1 (1993) (defense
counsel's "duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to defense counsel of
facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty"); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
523-37 (2003) (providing more detail on how much investigation is necessary to meet the constitutional
minimum and when it is reasonable to forgo investigation); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 335, at 2 ("[A] lawyer should make adequate inquiry into the relevant facts .... but, while he should
not accept as true that which he does not reasonably believe to be true, he does not have the responsibility to
'audit' the affairs of his client, without reasonable cause, that the client's statement of facts cannot be relied
on.").
50. MODEL RULES R. 1.1 cmt. 5.
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whether willful ignorance would violate the competence rule, it creates an odd
and confusing tension to encourage investigation through the substantive
standards of attorney conduct while simultaneously discouraging it indirectly
through the definition of knowledge. In addition to being an obtuse and
potentially confusing way of addressing the problem of lawyers hiding behind
claims of ignorance, it allows the bar to project a concern for the public and third
parties without requiring lawyers to fulfill that function in reality.
2. THE BAR'S EFFORTS AT SELF-REGULATION
Reacting to threats of government regulation, the bar has made nods toward a
more explicit willful ignorance standard in certain discrete contexts. Rather than
demonstrating a genuine response to concerns about lawyer abuse, these efforts
depict a professional organ that remains captive of its powerful clients and makes
changes only when necessary to satisfy regulators. Given the government's
increased interest in monitoring the conduct of professionals, the bar runs the risk
of rendering itself obsolete if it does not do more than passively and defensively
react during moments of public distrust.
In 1974, for instance, the bar issued an opinion regarding a lawyer's obligation
to investigate client representations in writing opinions supporting sales of
unregistered securities." Only certain securities are exempt from registration
requirements under the Securities Act of 1933. Companies were using opinion
letters from lawyers to claim these exceptions. The ABA instructed that attorneys
may rely solely on their clients' representations regarding the securities at issue
but must investigate further if there is anything suspicious or conspicuously
missing from those representations.5 2 The bar was careful to constrain even this
rather modest proposal to the specific context of opinions regarding unregistered
securities. Lawyers did not spontaneously address this problem on their own.
Rather, the bar was prompted to write this opinion by a Securities and Exchange
Commission Release, which threatened to impose an even heavier burden. The
SEC Release suggested that lawyers could never rely solely on their client's
representations regarding the proposed exceptions to the registration requirements and were required in all cases to pursue their own investigation. The ethics
opinion served as a way of forestalling greater external regulation.
In 1982, the bar analyzed lawyers' obligations in giving opinions regarding the

51. See ABA Comm. on Ethics Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (Feb. 2, 1974). This opinion was based
on the Model Code ofProfessionalConduct, the predecessor to the Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct, which
were adopted in 1982. Specifically, the opinion interprets Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(5), barring attorneys from
making a false statement of material fact in the opinion, and Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7), prohibiting lawyers
from knowingly assisting in criminal or fraudulent conduct. This conduct is currently proscribed by Rules 4.1(a)
and 1.2(d), respectively.
52. See id.
53. See ABA Comm. on Ethics Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 335, supra note 51, at 1.
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tax consequences of shelters. The ABA concluded that a lawyer violates ethical
prohibitions against making a knowingly false statement of law or fact when the
lawyer relies solely on his client's assertion of questionable facts in rendering a
tax shelter opinion: "The lawyer who accepts as true the facts which the promoter
tells him, when the lawyer should know that a further inquiry would disclose that
these facts are untrue, also gives a false opinion."5 4 As with the opinion regarding
unregistered securities, the bar published this opinion in response to a threat of
greater government regulation of lawyers' conduct. Here, the U.S. Department of
the Treasury had proposed a rule that would have required lawyers to comply
with prescribed due diligence requirements before issuing an opinion supporting
a tax shelter.
In 2003, after news of the corporate scandals broke, the bar amended Rule
1.13, which imposes obligations on entity lawyers to report managerial wrongdoing to certain authorities within the organization. The bar was prompted to make
these changes by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act legislation, which, among other things,
set ethical standards for attorneys appearing before the SEC.5 The SEC rules
promulgated pursuant to § 307 of the Act require that lawyers report to the chief
executive officer or chief legal officer when they have "credible evidence" of
wrongdoing. If the managers do not respond appropriately, the lawyer is
obligated to report to higher authority within the company.57 Model Rule 1.13
was amended in 2003 to impose substantially similar reporting requirements. The
reporting requirements in the ethical rules, however, are triggered when a lawyer
"knows" that an employee has violated certain legal obligations. Significantly,
the comments to this rule were also changed to elaborate on the meaning of
knowledge. Thus, comment 3 refers to the definition of knowledge as actual
knowledge but adds, "a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious."5 This comment
incorporates the willful ignorance standard in the context of reporting wrongdoing to higher authority within an entity client. It is perhaps not a coincidence that,
as with the 1974 opinion regarding legal advice with respect to exceptions to
registration requirements and the 1982 opinion on tax shelters, this opinion was
written in response to a threat of greater government regulation. The bar

54. ABA Comm. on Ethics Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982). The opinion analyzed this issue in
the context of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(5), the predecessor of Model Rule 4.1, which forbade a lawyer from
making a material misstatement of law or fact, and Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4), the predecessor of Rule
8.4(c), barring "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." Id.
55. Id. at n.2.
56. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). For a history of Model Rule 1.13
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see STEPHEN GtLLERs & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 173-75 (2007);

Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REv. 725 (2004); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's
Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236 (2003); William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinkingthe ProfessionalResponsibilitiesof the Business Lawyer, 75 FoRHAM L. Rev. 1453 (2006).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
58. MODEL RULES R. 1.13(b), cmt. 3 (2009).
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expanded the definition of knowledge in the comments to come close to the lower
threshold of "credible evidence" in the SEC regulations.
The bar's willingness to alter the definition of knowledge in this context is
unsurprising given that Rule 1.13 enforces duties to the client, not duties to third
parties. The client is, after all, the entity, and the tension between the duty of
confidentiality and the reporting obligation plays no role here.60 So reporting up
within the entity ought to be a rather uncontroversial aspect of the general duty of
loyalty to the client.6 1 Of course, this is not always the case, since the managers
exert a great deal of power and are often responsible for deciding which lawyer to
hire.6 2 This new comment to Rule 1.13 does nonetheless acknowledge, at least in
some circumstances, that it is appropriate to hold lawyers responsible when they
deliberately ignore important facts that might trigger difficult or awkward
obligations under the ethical rules.
A handful of state ethics cases have similarly cast the lawyer in a more active
regulatory role, holding that lawyers cannot simply accept their clients' version
of events and must investigate further, at least when the facts seem suspicious. In
In re Blatt, for instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the state ethics
committee's recommendation and held that a lawyer committed misconduct by
helping a client effect a purchase after failing to investigate its suspicious
nature. 63 The Maryland Supreme Court similarly found that disbarment was
appropriate when in-house counsel was convicted for concealing his employer's
immigration fraud despite the attorney's assertion that he did not know about the
crime." The attorney claimed that he had never intended to commit the crime
and, at most, he had deliberately avoided information that would have led him to

59. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
60. In fact, Rule 1.13 makes this clear. See MODEL RULEs R. 1.13(a).
61. Barbara Black, Tattlers and Trailblazers:Attorneys'Liabilityfor Clients'Frauds,46 WASHBURN L.J. 91,
99-100 (2006).
62. William H. Simon, Introduction: The Post-EnronIdentity Crisisof the Business Lawyer, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 947,947-50 (2005).
63. 324 A.2d 15, 17-19 (N.J. 1974). The court explained:
A lawyer may not follow the directions of a client without first satisfying himself that the latter is
seeking a legitimate and proper goal and intends to employ legal means to attain it. It is no excuse for
an attorney to say that he only did what he did because directed to do so by his client. The propriety of
any proposed course of action must be initially considered by the attorney, and it may be thereafter
pursued only if the lawyer is completely satisfied that it involves no ethical compromise. It is for the
lawyer, not the client, to make this decision.
Id. at 18.
64. See Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Wingerter, 929 A.2d 47, 51-56 (Md. 2007). Wingerter had been
convicted in federal court for this conduct so the court relied on Maryland Rule 8.4(b), which states that it is
misconduct for an attorney to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects," and 8.4(c), which bars an attorney from engaging in
conduct involving "dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation." Id. at 50 n.5.
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know that his employer was engaged in criminal conduct. 5 In In re Dobson, the
South Carolina court also sanctioned an attorney for helping his client while
remaining deliberately ignorant of his client's criminal conduct. 6 The attorney,
Robert A. Dobson III, signed a number of blank documents, which his client used
to engage in and backdate sham transactions to avoid SEC regulations. The
court found that Dobson had deliberately avoided knowledge that would have
implicated him in the fraudulent scheme and stated that the court "will not
countenance the conscious avoidance of one's ethical duties as an attorney."68
In light of historical precedent, it makes more sense to impose a willful
ignorance standard on lawyers than on other individuals. The ethical rules of
competence and diligence can be read to impose an obligation to know, just as the
statutes in the early American cases did. So, according to the historical narrative,
as society became more complex and relationships became more deeply
entwined and connected to social well-being, the courts acknowledged that
individuals can and ought to be responsible for regulating each other. As such,
they cannot avoid liability by manufacturing ignorance in the face of certain
obvious facts. The legal profession by its position in society and its selfproclaimed rules embodies a private role with clear public responsibility.
Arguably, this pre-existing obligation makes it more appropriate to apply the
willful ignorance standard to lawyers than to ordinary individuals under the
criminal law. The professional is in a position similar to Jewell's (the drug mule
who was asked to drive a car full of drugs across the border)-he is critical to the
success of the enterprise, but he need not have direct knowledge of its nefarious
purpose to play his role. But a lawyer, unlike a drug mule, has some sort of
independent legal obligation to know, so his willful blindness ought to be, if

anything, more blameworthy.

II. PROFESSOR LUBAN'S ARGUMENT AND THE IMPACT ON THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
After elegantly exploring the meaning and import of willful ignorance in
criminal law, David Luban concludes that lawyers ought to be exempt from this
general standard. In other words, he argues, any application of willful ignorance
to lawyers' conduct would poison the attorney-client relationship too severely.
Professor Luban argues that holding lawyers responsible for consciously
avoiding certain facts will turn the lawyer and client into adversaries. According

to Luban, clients would intentionally subvert attorneys' investigations of their
65. Id. at 55-56. It is not entirely clear whether the court accepted the idea that Wingerter could be sanctioned
when he lacked actual knowledge or assumed that the hearing court rejected this explanation and found that he
did, in fact, know about the fraudulent conduct. See id. at 57.
66. See In re Dobson, 427 S.E.2d 166, 166-68 (S.C. 1993).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 168.
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case, knowing that the lawyer is ethically required to find incriminating
information, which the lawyer might then be required to turn over. In the process,
the client might inadvertently hide innocent facts from the lawyer, which the
lawyer needs to represent the client adequately. In sum, the lawyer "may be
forced to play a cat-and-mouse game of sleuthing against her own evasive
clients.""
Professor Luban's fear, however, is misguided as a general matter, and in the
context of corporate representation, simply inapplicable. There is no reason that a
requirement not to avoid obvious and relevant facts should lead an unsuspecting
lawyer to investigate any more than he would have otherwise. The requirement
would only force attorneys to look further when they encounter obvious signs of
wrongdoing. There is no reason to assume that under most circumstances lawyers
would be any more cautious than they would have been under the current
standard. The rule as written, after all, allows knowledge to be inferred from the
circumstances. The only difference would occur when the facts indicate a high
probability of wrongdoing and the lawyer declines to investigate nonetheless. In
the criminal context, courts have made it clear that a person ought not to be held
responsible when he merely fails to make an inquiry upon suspicion, but only
when he fails to investigate blatant signs of wrongdoing.7 0 The ethical rules could
easily import the same safeguards.
In addition, this argument is based on the unlikely assumption that a client
cannot determine what sort of evidence will be helpful to his case but will be able
to discern the meaning and import of the confidentiality rules and their
exceptions.71 It seems far more likely that a client will not understand the full
extent of the lawyer's responsibility to report falsehoods or investigate upon clear
signs of wrongdoing. If, on the other hand, the client is sophisticated and
comprehends the effect of the new definition of knowledge on the lawyer's
obligations, the client would most likely also be able to make informed decisions
about what information is necessary to ensure the efficacy of the representation.7 2
Underlying Professor Luban's critique of the doctrine is a concern that adding
any obligation to investigate, even if it were triggered only by obvious signs of
wrongdoing, would irreparably damage the attorney-client relationship. The
attorney-client relationship is, however, more resilient than that. Clients have, for
instance, adapted to the fact that a lawyer may turn on the client if he knows that
the client has lied to the court.73 It is not clear why holding lawyers responsible
69. Luban, supra note 9, at 977.
70. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
71. See William H. Simon, The Ethics of CriminalDefense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1703, 1719-21 (1993).
72. Id.
73. Some scholars have argued that there is a limited duty to investigate a client's assertions to avoid putting
on perjured testimony. See J. Kevin Quinn et al., Resisting the Individualistic Flavor of Opposition to Model
Rule 3.3, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 901, 905-06 (2005) (arguing that Model Rule 1.1 requires some factual
investigation into client's assertions to provide competent representation).
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for deliberately ignoring obvious facts would constitute the straw that broke the
camel's back rather than just another obligation the lawyer has to the judicial
system.74
In addition to the relatively minimal damage this requirement would inflict on
the attorney-client relationship, it is not clear that the current incentives for
lawyers to remain ignorant of perjury or wrongdoing, in fact, help the client.
Critics of mandatory disclosure rules have long argued that good representation
requires full knowledge. They have suggested that the incentive for lawyers to
blind themselves to unpleasant facts, which is at play in the rules as written,
distorts a lawyer's understanding of the case and cripples his ability to represent
his client adequately.75 Thus, it may often be the case that the attorney's
deliberate ignorance harms the client, though the client may think otherwise.
While proscribing willful ignorance is not the solution these critics seek, it would
address the problem they identify in a different way.76
In rejecting the idea of willful ignorance, Luban relies heavily on examples of
defense lawyers who represent individuals accused of a crime. In doing so, Luban
implicitly concedes that, like the bar, he too is wedded to the notion that we must
have one set of substantive ethical standards for all practicing attorneys. In the
criminal context, because of the inequality in resources and adversarial relationship between government and client, the role of the defense attorney has
traditionally been viewed differently.7 8 Arguably, the constitutional right to
testify changes the calculus.7 9 Most scholars and attorneys agree that criminal
defense lawyers ought to be allowed to take advantage of loopholes, trick their
opponents, and stretch the law to its limits to help their clients. The rules, which
mean other things in other contexts, are frequently read to permit such conduct.8 0

74. See Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1347 (2004) (arguing that lawyers
had been acting as gatekeepers long before recent legislative and regulatory proposals).
75. See MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics 109-13 (1990)
76. Rather than creating a right to present false testimony by allowing lawyers to remain ignorant of the
truth, critics like Freedman suggest the rules ought directly to permit false testimony, at least in some
circumstances. It makes sense to address this issue directly, rather than create the right to testify falsely in a
circuitous manner by sanctioning, and even tacitly encouraging lawyers to remain ignorant of the truth. See id.
77. Luban, supra note 9, at 976-80; see also Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1152.
78. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1988).
79. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986).
80. See Gordon, supra note 78, at 10-11. In most cases, the rules do not draw explicit distinctions between
practice areas. All lawyers are technically required to follow the same rules in the same way. There are a few
exceptions. For instance, Model Rule 3.8 directly addresses the role of prosecutors and Model Rule 3.3(a)(3)
states that lawyers may refuse to introduce evidence when they "reasonably believe" the evidence is false.
However, the rule states that a criminal defense attorney must allow his client to testify unless he "knows" that
the evidence is false. Rule 3.1 similarly allows criminal defense lawyers to make some arguments that might be
considered frivolous in a civil context. Even when the rules do not make clear distinctions, generally criminal
defense lawyers are allowed more latitude in playing with the ethical rules. For instance, conduct that might be
considered disruptive in a civil context under Model Rule 3.5(d) would certainly be tolerated by a criminal
defense attorney.
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It is not clear, however, that avoiding knowledge that might trigger a reporting
obligation or limit the lawyer's ability to call his client to the stand is in fact
helpful to criminal defendants. Having a lawyer who investigates and understands all the relevant facts is useful, arguably even essential, to criminal
defendants, just as it is for other clients. For that reason, the bar itself has
discouraged selective investigation on the part of defense lawyers.8 1 Thus,
scholars who emphasize the necessity of the actual knowledge requirement to
allow lawyers technically to comply with the ethical rules are misguided. The
debate should shift instead to the proper balance between duties to the client and
the legal system in the context of criminal cases. If we-can agree that criminal
defense attorneys ought to be held to a different standard then the substantive
rules regarding perjured testimony ought to be revised to reflect that consensus.
That said, there is no reason to assume that criminal representations are so
inherently different, so adversarial, that they categorically resist the imposition of
rules designed to protect the judicial system. As the Supreme Court has ruled, the
constitutional right to testify is by no means absolute.82 Scholars and many
practicing attorneys tend to exempt criminal defense lawyers from the critique of
overly aggressive and adversarial lawyering." Professor William Simon argues
that this impulse is based on a libertarian understanding of the relationship
between the state and the individual. It derives, he suggests, from a fear of
totalitarianism-of a state that wields too much power. While this fear is of
course compelling, Simon argues that it tends toward such a panic that it
outgrows its logic. This kind of libertarianism ignores the concern lurking at the
other extreme, which stems from anarchy-a weak state unable to protect its
citizens from private harm. The libertarian lawyering rhetoric tends to write both
the victims and the public out of the story. In other words, strengthening the
individual defendant (regardless of his guilt) at the expense of the state ends up
harming other individuals, not simply the abstract entity of government. 84 Out of
concern for these individuals-the public in general and the victims in
particular-criminal defendants do not have a right to testify falsely. 8 5 Nor do
they have a right to their lawyer's assistance in wrongdoing.8 6 As a general
matter, the ethical rules' definition of knowledge should not be used surrepti-

81. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense Function 4-3.2(b) (1993); see also STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense Function 3.2, cmt. (1970) (warning that advising the client not to admit
anything that might make it difficult for the lawyer to call the defendant to the stand is "most egregious" and is
advocated only by "unscrupulous" lawyers); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense Function 4-3.2,

cmt. (1993) (describing such conduct as a "flagrant" impropriety).
82. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that defense counsel's threats to report the defendant
if he perjured himself did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
83. See Gordon, supra note 78, at 11.
84. See Simon, supra note 71, at 1713.
85. See MODEL RuLEs R. 3.3; Nix, 475 U.S. at 169.
86. See MODEL RuLEs R. 1.2(d).
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tiously to create those rights. By allowing lawyers to avoid obvious facts that
would expose their clients' falsehoods or force them to withdraw from a
representation in which their services were being used to commit a crime or
fraud, the Rules essentially do just that-manufacture these rights without fully
acknowledging their implication.
If, as Professor Monroe Freedman has advocated, the bar concludes that
defense lawyers should not have to reveal their clients' perjury, then the rules
should say so directly. They should limit the duty to reveal perjury of criminal
defendants to situations in which doing so would not interfere with obligations of
confidentiality." Otherwise, the ethical rules use the knowledge requirement to
create this substantive reality while obscuring it at the same time. It is hard to see
how this subterfuge solves any of the problems. Defense lawyers are subtly being
encouraged to do what is otherwise forbidden by the ethical rules.8 The rules
make it such that they either remain deliberately ignorant of the facts of the
case-arguably a violation of the competence rules-or violate the rules
regarding perjured testimony. This creates an odd dynamic further alienating
defense attorneys from the rest of the bar and making their work seem somehow
illicit. Rather than cast criminal defense attorneys as part of a counterculture just
a step away from their more unsavory clients, the bar ought to be explicit about
their obligations.89 Either the rules should allow attorneys to introduce false
evidence in this context or they should prohibit it. But permitting them to do so
by manufacturing ignorance threatens to interfere with the quality of their
representations or simply create a culture of disobedience. 90
Professor Luban implies that this bit of dissembling is necessary for the system
to work and for the participants to feel good about themselves.91 It seems to me
quite the contrary-the accepted dishonesty inevitably takes a toll on both the
system and the individuals involved. Just as living with technical truths that are in
fact false or at least misleading undermines an individual's own sense of
integrity, the systematic and institutionalized version of this will inevitably erode
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and marginalize defense attorneys.9 2

87. See Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 133, 133-42
(2008).
88. See id. at 142-49. Freedman quotes an ABA ethics opinion, which makes it clear that the knowledge
requirement is designed to allow defense lawyers to avoid knowledge of the truth in order to allow their clients
to testify falsely. Thus, in the words of ABA Formal Opinion 87-353, it will be "the unusual case" where the
lawyer "does know" that a client intends to commit perjury. Knowledge can be established only by the client's
"clearly stated intention" to perjure himself at trial. Id. at 142 (quoting ABA Formal Opinion 87-353).
89. See Jed S. Rakoff, How Can You Defend Those Crooks, N.Y. L.J., Sept 25, 1990.
90. In a different context, David Luban has argued that promoting or tolerating unethical conduct in one area
can lead to a kind of gerrymandering of all ethical and moral obligations. See LUBAN, supra note 4, at 237.
91. See id. at 229-36.
92. There is a rich psychoanalytic literature on the effect of silence or lies on individuals and the broader
social impact of systematized untruths. See, e.g., Sdndor Ferenczi, The Confusion of Tongues in Adults and the
Child, reprinted in FINAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS AND METHODS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 156 (1955)
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The effort to pretend that criminal defense lawyers abide by the same rules as
the rest of the bar does not protect the defense bar. It does not promote effective
representations. But it does allow the bar to dodge a difficult issue. It sets the
stage for the bar to perpetuate the myth, identified by Professor David Wilkins,
"that it is a single profession bound together by unique and specialized norms and
practices." 9 3 In fact, the defense bar may need distinct rules and regulations. To
recognize this, however, would require the bar to relinquish this foundational
belief. By doing so, it would jeopardize the notion that the profession is unified in
its ability to transcend profit to preserve the public. 94 As many scholars have
argued, especially in light of the recent financial crisis, perhaps we have to move
beyond this paradigm of professionalism. The vision of a single profession
united in its service of the public and its ethical standards may do more harm than
good.9 Perhaps, this myth constrains creative responses that might help lawyers
to adjust to the modem market with all its complex and only partially understood
demands. In this context, it makes more sense to insist that all lawyers pay
attention to key facts, palatable or not, than to require that all lawyers disclose
those facts equally at all times. The former has value in all investigations and
representations while the latter seems necessarily to shift depending on the nature
of the client and his goals.
Professor Luban elaborates his concern about the deleterious effect of the
application of conscious avoidance to lawyers by using the example of the
innocent criminal defendant. What happens, he asks, if an innocent client is
telling a true story but making up the details? What if that client has already told
his partially true story in a court document? In his hypothetical, a diligent but
cautious lawyer stumbles on facts that very likely contradict some peripheral
aspects of the client's story. Under the proposed regime where he would suffer
professional discipline for willfully avoiding the truth, the lawyer would
investigate, discover the falsehoods, and would then be forced to retract a largely
truthful document to his innocent client's detriment.9 7
This scenario is, on some level, more convincing than general arguments
against empowering the state to the detriment of the defendant. Almost everyone

(orig. pub. 1932); THE COLLECTIVE SILENCE: GERMAN IDENTITY AND THE LEGACY OF SHAME (Barbara

Heimannsberg & Christoph J. Schmidt, eds., 1993).
93. Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1148.
94. See id. at 1148-49.
95. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession:A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L.
REv. 869 (1990); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conductand Reputation ofthe Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995); Milton C. Regan,
Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties,and the Value of Proffssionalism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1, 3 (1999).
For a discussion of the fate of professionalism after the economic downturn, see Symposium, The Lawyer's Role
in a ContemporaryDemocracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1591 (2009).
96. See Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1216-20; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARv. L.
REv. 799, 836-37 (1992).
97. See Luban, supra note 9, at 977.
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would agree that we do not want to strengthen the state at the expense of innocent
individuals. This concern, however, is more academic than real. First of all, as an
empirical matter, it seems an unlikely scenario. And if it really is more common
than expected, the rules could add a materiality requirement to the duty to
disclose.9 8 Such a requirement already exists for perjury, so the lawyer would not
risk exposing his client to criminal penalty.99 Alternatively, in his disclosure, the
lawyer could make it clear to the court and others that it is only a few details of
the story that are off and explain the reason for the discrepancy. As discussed
above, the rules should be read in context and should this unlikely scenario come
to pass, the authorities could read any of the applicable rules, including the
definition of knowledge, to. excuse the attorney's failure to report.
Similarly, Professor Luban argues that sometimes, in real life, remaining
ignorant of the truth is the right thing to do for the client and for the service of
justice. He tells the story of a woman who is seeking political asylum. She
recounts that she was a victim of political oppression, raped and tortured in jail
and later threatened with death. The lawyer has corroborated all but this last
detail. When the lawyer inquires about her brother who now lives in the United
States, the client becomes uncomfortable, leaving the lawyer with the impression
that the brother has some unfavorable information. Luban claims that the lawyer
ought to be allowed to avoid this information by aborting his investigation.xoo
This may be true, just as at times lying to third parties will serve the ends of the
client and the ends of justice. Nevertheless, we do not generally allow the
exception to demolish the rule. By analogy, it would not make sense to abolish
the law against trespass simply because civil rights protestors were justified in
breaking this law.'0o Disciplinary authorities have ample discretion to take the
circumstances of the case into account in determining whether to bring an action
and what sorts of sanctions to issue, if they choose to do so. 1 0 2 Luban
acknowledges as much but then suggests that allowing lawyers to remain
ignorant of these unpleasant facts makes it such that they can serve justice
without breaking the rules. 0 3 True, but Luban's proposed status quo disarms the
disciplinary authorities and renders them incapable of punishing those who abuse

98. There is already a materiality requirement in the duty not to make false statements to third parties. See
MODEL RuLEs R. 4.1(a).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994).
100. See LUBAN, supra note 4, at 232-36.
101. See William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-CategoricalMoralism, 12 GEo. J. LEGAL
Emics 433, 433-35 (1999) (arguing that all ethical rules and moral precepts must be read and interpreted in
context and sometimes it makes sense to disregard them).
102. Cf William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in PopularCulture, 101 COLuM. L. REv. 421,440-47
(2001) (suggesting that ethics rules must be understood and applied not as categorical edicts but rather with
careful attention to context and the overall justice of a particular situation); Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1151-60
(arguing that ethical rules are only meaningful in context and regulators regularly rely on context in applying
them).
103. See LuBAN, supra note 4, at 234.
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the knowledge requirement to disserve justice.
While the notion of conscious avoidance is relevant when lawyers represent
individuals, it comes up most frequently in the corporate context. This is because
sophisticated criminal enterprises can and do play with the division of labor and
responsibility. They succeed by creating a sum more powerful than the
enterprises' parts and they do so, in part, by making sure that no individual and no
firm is the repository for all the knowledge or all the wrongdoing. This generates
plausible deniability, which protects the individuals along with the enterprise.1 04
Lawyers often contribute to this dynamic by defining their job narrowly.
Professor Robert Gordon observed this process, describing a group of corporate
lawyers who view themselves as "myopic" or "limited-function bureaucrat[s]"
whose representation is confined by the information given to them by the
client. 105
In a preliminary report, the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility,
appointed shortly after Enron and other high profile corporate scandals at the
beginning of this century, explained that lawyers involved in these frauds
"accept[ed] management's instructions and limit[ed] their advice and/or services
to a narrowly defined scope, ignoring the context or implications of the advice
they [gave]." 1 0 6 The preliminary report explained that "[t]here has also been
criticism of corporate lawyers for turning a blind eye to the natural consequences
of what they observe and claiming that they did not 'know' that the corporate
officers they were advising were engaged in misconduct." 107 The Task Force
concluded that, "while lawyers should not be subject to discipline for simple
negligence, they should not be permitted to ignore the obvious." 108 The
preliminary report recommended that the new definition of knowledge ought to
apply to provisions barring lawyers from assisting in client crime and lying to
third parties, as well as reporting up the ladder within a corporation.109 This was
obviously a source of controversy, as the final report dropped the suggestion for
all provisions except Rule 1.13, the rule requiring reporting illegality to higher
authority within a corporate client.1 1 0

104. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICs 197, 200 (2000). See generally KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF
ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985).

105. Gordon, supra note 4, at 1193-94.
106. ABA TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY REPORT (2002), reprinted in 58 Bus.
LAW. 189, 207 (2002) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT].

107. Id. at 208; see also Gordon, supra note 4, at 1190 (describing a belief among corporate law practitioners
that "passive acquiescence" in client fraud and "the failure to inquire or investigate" are consistent with the
"highest conceptions of legal, ethical, and professional propriety").
108. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 106, at 208.

109. See id.
110. Am. BAR Ass'N TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, FINAL REPORT (2003), reprintedin 59 Bus.

LAW. 159, 167-70 (2003) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The report is also available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
corporateresponsibility/final-report.pdf. The preliminary report noted that it was meant to serve as "a vehicle to
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The ethical rules were written with individuals in mind. They are, at best,
clumsy in their application to business entities.' The knowledge requirement is
no exception. Even if it were true that requiring a defense attorney who represents
an individual to pursue obvious facts would create an improper balance between
the state and the individual, this argument would not apply to business lawyers. In
the corporate context, the corporation and the government are far more equal
adversaries, with the former outweighing the latter in resources more often than
not. More importantly, in most situations they are not quite adversaries. At times,
the entity client will be best served by working with regulators to ensure
transparency.1 12 The lawyer is in no position to help the client make the critical
decision of whether this is so if the lawyer has allowed himself to be diverted
from important and relevant facts. As Professor David Wilkins argues, corporate
clients are far more powerful market players. They can exert more pressure on
lawyers to carry out their immediate wishes. In the corporate context, the Model
Rules ought to strengthen the lawyers' commitment to the law and the integrity of
the legal system."13
The concern about the effect of the conscious avoidance standard on the
attorney-client relationship is similarly out of place in the corporate context. The
relationship between the lawyer and the authorized representatives of his client is
complicated by its very nature. The lawyer has no choice but to interact with his
client through its managers, but the lawyer does not represent those individuals.' 14 Given that the corporation's agents might be acting disloyally or at least
self-interestedly, the lawyer ought to have some distance from them in order to
serve the company as a whole. In representing an organizational client, importing
the criminal law standard for knowledge would, if anything, affect the
relationship between the lawyer and the agents of the corporation. Because the
lawyer does not represent those individuals and the interests of the individuals
and the organizational client often diverge, we ought to view this wedge as a
positive means to ensure that the lawyer does not rely entirely on the
representations of agents as opposed to independently assessing the interests of

elicit comments from interested observers, within the ABA and elsewhere, through a written comment process
and one or more public hearings." Id. at 190. While the final report does not directly address the definition of
knowledge in contexts other than Rule 1.13, it does note that commentators at the public hearings argued that
lawyers for a corporation are not gatekeepers and are "first and foremost counselors to their clients." Id. at 156.
111. See Regan, supra note 104, at 199.
112. See Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REv. 255, 258-59
(1990).
113. See Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1204-15.
114. See MODEL RULEs R. 1.13(a). There are a number of impressive explications of the complications and
potential problems inherent in the representation of organizations. See, e.g., Gordon, supranote 78; William H.
Simon, Aftr Confidentiality:Rethinking the ProfessionalResponsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1453 (2006) [hereinafter Simon, After Confidentiality];William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the
Organization'sLawyer Represent? An Anatomy of IntraclientConflict, 91 CAL. L. REv. 57 (2003) [hereinafter
Simon, Organization'sLawyer].
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the entity.
Even if the officers of the corporation would prefer to control the information,
in most circumstances the corporation itself will be best served by a lawyer who
has full knowledge of its operations. It is hard to imagine how shareholders or the
entity in the long run would benefit from a lawyer who is ignorant of his client's
actions. If the representation does benefit the client, it is certainly despite the
lawyer's ignorance not because of it. Holding lawyers responsible for consciously avoiding relevant facts will help strengthen the lawyer's obligation to his
client, as opposed to its representatives."15
Acting on behalf of an organizational client rather than one of its many
constituents is a difficult task. It is hard to determine when to defer to the
managers' judgment and when the managers have conflicts that render them
untrustworthy arbiters of the organization's best interest.116 There is no hope,
however, that an attorney can determine the client's interest (let alone when
managers have abandoned it) if the managers are allowed to keep him, with his
own complicity, in the dark. In other words, in this context, the underlying
purpose of the attorney client privilege-to promote trust so that an attorney can
help the client reconcile his own interests with the dictates of the law-cannot
possibly be realized unless the lawyer refuses to allow himself to be blinded to
unpleasant facts.
Professor Luban argues that forbidding lawyers from remaining oblivious to
obvious facts will conscript individuals into paying for lawyers who will serve as
their own private investigators. It could force companies to become a financial
participant in their own demise."' 7 While superficially appealing, the logic
unravels upon further thought. Clients already have to pay for legal services,
which include an obligation on the part of attorneys to do things that might hurt
the client. For instance, lawyers are not permitted to present false testimony," 8
and they are required to disclose information if the failure to do so would result in
the lawyer participating in a client's wrongdoing." 9 In the corporate context, this
seems particularly unproblematic. Public companies are required to hire outside
auditors and at least theoretically, accountants are investigators who have the task
of uncovering and reporting information regardless of whether it helps their

115. See generally Gordon, supra note 78; Simon, After Confidentiality, supra note 114; Simon,
Organization'sLawyer, supra note 114.
116. See Regan, supra note 104, at 199-200.
117. See Luban, supra note 9, at 977.
118. MODEL RuLEs R. 3.3.
119. MODEL RULEs R. 4.1(b). I use the example of perjury and client fraud to illustrate the point because
these are the most debated and most contested applications of the knowledge requirement. Knowledge does,
however, appear as a requirement in other rules, such as Model Rule 4.2, which forbids lawyers from contacting
parties whom they "know" are represented by another lawyer.
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client. 12 0 As discussed above, while it may indeed hurt some of the agents of the
corporation, uncovering wrongdoing in many circumstances will benefit the
organizational client in the long run.
A different objection might be articulated as follows: A lawyer who assisted a
client in a crime by remaining willfully ignorant of all the relevant facts will still
have violated the criminal law. A lawyer who has violated the criminal law will
most likely have violated the ethical rules anyway, as Rule 8.4(b) forbids a
lawyer from "commit[ting] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." 12 1 As a result, it
does not really matter whether the knowledge requirement explicitly forbids such
conduct.
Combined with the fact that relatively few lawyers are actually disciplined,
this is, at least superficially, a persuasive argument. The Model Rules, however,
serve a symbolic function. They communicate-albeit in a somewhat conflicted
fashion-an ideology of the profession. Professor Richard Abel has argued that
the primary function of the rules is to legitimate the profession in the public eye
rather than serve as an effective means of regulation.' 2 2 The current definition of
knowledge confirms this thesis. The rules send a message that lawyers must serve
the public by protecting the integrity of judicial proceedings and refusing to aid
their clients in misconduct. The message borders on empty because, in reality,
lawyers can evade these obligations by turning a blind eye to any facts that might
trigger them. By explicitly forbidding lawyers from blinding themselves to
unpleasant facts, which might ultimately put them in the difficult position of
withdrawing, revealing client confidences, or reporting up the ladder, the rules
would begin to articulate a definition of the profession more in tune with popular
hope, if not expectation. 1 2 3 They would send a message that the role of the lawyer
requires more than simply checking off boxes about the legality of facts handed

120. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000) (requiring an independent audit as part of
registration statement); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000) (requiring independent
audits as part of annual reports); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, §§ 101, 105,
203 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) (establishing a board to
oversee auditors and setting enforceable standards for auditor independence). Accountants are subject to
"GAAS," or generally accepted accounting practices. As scholars have pointed out, however, accountants are
only motivated to do what is minimally required by those standards. See, e.g., Peter K.M. Chan, Breaking the
Market's Dependence on Independence: An Alternative to the "Independent" Outside Auditor, 9 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 347, 348 (2004); Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of
Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1186-87
(2004).
121. MODEL RuLEs R. 8.4(b). For an example of a case in which an attorney was disciplined for violating the
criminal law by remaining willfully ignorant of his client's criminal conduct, see Att'y Grievance Comm'n of
Md. v. Wingerter, 929 A.2d 47 (Md. 2007).
122. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 143 (1991); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA
PromulgateEthical Rules?, 59 'Thx. L. REv. 639,686 (1981).
123. See Colin Croft, Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism:A Proposalfor Deliberative
Moral Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1256 (1992); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on
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to the lawyer by the client.
III. ArroRNEY LIABILYTY IN CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND SEC ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS
Courts and other regulatory bodies have become increasingly involved in
policing lawyer conduct, especially in the context of client fraud.124 Unsurprisingly, in both civil and criminal cases, courts generally do not excuse lawyers
who help their clients commit crimes but deliberately avoid the illicit nature of
their clients' conduct. 1 25 As Professor William Simon has argued in a slightly
different context, lawyers demonstrate a "visceral clinging to the prerogatives of
ignorance and ambiguity," even though the law denies such a shield to their
clients. 1 26 Not only does this double standard seem inherently unfair and
self-interested, it is also confusing. Lawyers are held to a less demanding
standard in disciplinary proceedings than in other contexts. Civil, criminal, and
regulatory law will generally hold lawyers responsible if they deliberately avoid
knowledge of critical facts while the ethical rules do not. Lawyers, brought up on
these rules and the culture they create, may not realize that conduct cast as
aggressive advocacy could subject them to legal sanctions.
Furthermore, as the bar drags behind other regulators, it runs the risk of
rendering itself obsolete. As government entities become more interested in
regulating the profession, the bar must send a clear message of its own, rather
than lag behind, reacting only defensively to moments of increased regulation.
The application of the willful ignorance standard by courts and government
agencies also demonstrates the government's increasing interest in regulating
lawyers as part of an industry, rather than as a unitary profession. The fact that the
government recognizes distinctions between different sorts of practicing attorneys ought to put some pressure on the bar to begin thinking in a transparent way
about these differences.
A. CRIMINAL LAW
While prosecutors have historically shied away from pursuing lawyers for
their part in corporate crime, several prominent cases have begun to undermine

Professional Responsibility and the 2003 Changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J.
LEGAL Eniucs 35, 56 (2003).
124. See Wilkins, supra note 96, at 807-08; Ted Schneyer, An Interpretationof Recent Developments in the
Regulation of Law Practice,30 OKLA. Crry U. L. REv. 559, 596 (2005).
125. See H. Lowell Brown, The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel Facedwith Client Misconduct: Disclosure
of Client Confidences or ConstructiveDischarge,44 BuFF. L. REv. 777, 777-78 (1996).
126. William Simon makes this argument in the context of the bar's struggle with the Securities and
Exchange Commission over the "noisy withdrawal" obligation. William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and
Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibilityfor Collective Misconduct,22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30 (2005).
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this convention. 1 27 As discussed above, federal criminal law and the law of most
states subjects individuals, including lawyers, to punishment if they willfully
ignore obvious facts, knowledge of which would otherwise subject them to
criminal liability. 1 2 8 In United States v. Benjamin, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit applied this standard to a lawyer and an accountant who were
involved in securities fraud. 129 In upholding the conviction, Judge Friendly held
that "the Government can meet its burden by proving that a defendant
deliberately closed his eyes to facts he had a duty to see."130 In issuing the
opinion, Judge Friendly explained:
In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can
be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the
crowbar. Of course, Congress did not mean that any mistake of law or
misstatement of fact should subject an attorney or an accountant to criminal
liability simply because more skillful practitioners would not have made them.
But Congress equally could not have intended that men holding themselves out
as members of these ancient professions should be able to escape criminal
liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut their eyes to what was
plainly to be seen or have represented a knowledge they knew they did not
possess. 131
According to Judge Friendly, lawyers, by definition, are required to know
certain facts about the representation and cannot escape liability by claiming
ignorance.
Despite this precedent, prosecutions of outside counsel for participating in
their clients' frauds are rare. The lawyers involved in the Enron transactions, for
instance, were never prosecuted.13 2 Nonetheless, prosecutors do periodically
indict lawyers for their roles in client fraud. 13 3 Recently, Joseph Collins, the head
of the derivatives group at Mayer Brown was convicted for assisting in a $2.4
billion accounting and securities fraud at Refco. Collins drafted documents that

127. Some scholars have even suggested that the lawyers who issued opinion letters about torture in the Bush
administration ought to be prosecuted. See Claire Finkelstein & Michael W. Lewis, Should Bush Administration
Lawyers Be ProsecutedforAuthorizing Torture?, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 195 (2010).
128. See supra notes 15-38 and accompanying text.
129. See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
130. Id. at 862.
131. Id. at 863. In a similar case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the conviction of several
lawyers who assisted in a fraud, rejecting the claim that they were merely fulfilling their professional
obligations and were unaware of the illegal activity. See United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 152-53 (2d Cir.
1974). A civil RICO claim for mail or wire fraud can also rest on the allegation that an individual lacked actual
knowledge because he deliberately avoided the truth. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Line Co.,
642 F. Supp. 781, 803 (D. La. 1986).
132. See Michael J. de la Merced, Lawyerfor Refco Charged in Fraud,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 2007.
133. See id.; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Two Top Tyco Executives Charged With $600 Million FraudScheme, N.Y.
TImEs, Sept. 13, 2002. At times, lawyers are indicted for conduct that the bar might have cast as aggressive
advocacy. See Bruce A. Green, The CriminalRegulation ofLawyers, 67 FoRDHAM L. REv. 327, 355-60 (1998).
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helped the company executives move billions of dollars of debt off the books in a
series of sham transactions. Collins failed to convince the jury that the Refco
officials kept him in the dark and that his job was not to police the company.' 34
B. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD
The jurisprudence of lawyer liability for securities fraud is somewhat
complicated. 35 In 1994, the Supreme Court held that private plaintiffs could not
bring suits for aiding and abetting under section lOb-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Act, which prohibits corporate securities fraud. 1 3 6 After this case,
courts have struggled over determining when an individual-including a
lawyer-has engaged in the proscribed act, as opposed to accessorial conduct. '
Section lOb-5(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act forbids individuals from
knowingly making material misrepresentations of fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. Some circuits require that the lawyer or firm
actually make the misstatement to constitute a violation of the securities laws,
while others find it sufficient if the lawyer participated in the preparation of the
fraudulent documents. 13 8 Lawyers may also be held liable for participating in
their clients' fraud under section 1Ob-5(a) and (c) if they know (or are reckless in
not knowing) that their clients' trades are manipulative.1
Despite the disagreement over the extent of lawyer liability, courts do hold
individuals liable for material misrepresentation under the securities laws if they
are reckless in their disregard of the underlying facts.1 4 0 Thus, an attorney who
deliberately deceives himself about his client's criminal conduct. would be
considered to have violated the securities laws as long as he met the requirements

134. See Mark Hamblett, Attorney Convicted of 5 Counts in $2.4 Billion FederalFraud,N.Y L.J., July 13,
2009.
135. See Mark I. Steinberg, The CorporateSecuritiesAttorney as a Moving Target-ClientFraudDilemmas,
46 WAsmuRN L.J. 1 (2006).
136. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 183-91 (1994).
137. See Elizabeth Cosenza, Rethinking Attorney Liability Under 10b-5 in Light of the Supreme Court's
Decisions in Tellabs and Stoneridge, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2008).
138. See Barbara Black, Tattlers and Trailblazers:Attorneys'Liabilityfor Client Fraud,46 WASH. L. REV.
91, 94-95 (2006).
139. See id. at 95-96.
140. See United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004); Southland Secs. Corp. v. Inspire Ins.
Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cit. 2004); Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 344
(4th Cir. 2003); Wortley v. Camplin, 333 F.3d 284, 294 (1st Cir. 2003); Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 317
F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cit. 2003); In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 672 n.16 (3d Cit. 2002); City of
Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001); Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d
1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001); Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 99-100 (2d
Cir. 2001); Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 1995); Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271,
1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has equated recklessness with a conscious
disregard for the truth. See PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 681 (6th Cir. 2004).
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of primary liability under 10b-5.14 1 In Kline v. First Western Government
Securities, Inc., investors relied on a law firm's opinion letters regarding the tax
consequences of their investment, which they made through the defendant First
Western. When they did not receive the favorable tax consequences, they sued the
law firm for negligent misrepresentation. 14 2 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found that the law firm could be held liable even though it stated explicitly
that it was basing its opinion on the client's representations and did no
independent investigation. The court held that an "opinion must not be made with
reckless disregard of its falsity or with a lack of genuine belief that the
information disclosed was accurate and complete in all material respects." 4 3 The
court explained that:
When a representation is made by professionals ... there is an obligation to
disclose data indicating that the opinion or forecast may be doubtful. When the
opinion or forecast is based on underlying materials which on their face or
under the circumstances suggest that they cannot be relied on without further
inquiry, then the failure to investigate further may support an inference that
when the defendant expressed the opinion it had no genuine belief that it had
the information on which it could predicate that opinion.144
Thus, courts have been less reluctant to hold lawyers to a more robust
obligation to the public than the bar. Specifically, case law tends to support some
obligation to pursue potentially unfavorable facts.
C. NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
In some civil contexts, courts also impose a duty on lawyers to investigate their
client's representations. Thus, a lawyer who blinds himself to obvious impropriety may well be subject to civil penalty.
In FDICv. O'Melveny & Myers, for instance, the receiver of a failed thrift sued

141. See SEC v. Kasirer, No. 04-CV-04340 (N.D. Ill. filed June 29,2004), Litig. Release No. 19131 (Mar. 11,
2005), availableat http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl9l31.htm. In Kasirer,the SEC alleged that Joel
Boehm, an attorney who acted as the underwriter's counsel, issued favorable opinions regarding bond offerings
despite his knowledge, or reckless disregard, of the fact that the bond proceeds were being wrongfully
commingled and diverted. See Andreo v. Friedlander, 660 F. Supp. 1362, 1366-67 (D. Conn. 1987). Andreo was
decided before CentralBank and the attorney was found liable for aiding and abetting his client's fraud. The
elements of an aiding and abetting claim include knowledge of the underlying fraud, but the court found that the
knowledge requirement could be met if the defendant recklessly disregarded the truth. See id.; see also Abell v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 E2d 1104, 1128 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding the evidence insufficient to support liability
under the securities laws when the lawyer ignored several red flags that ought to have led him to suspect the
propriety of his client's offering because the lawyer was not reckless in doing so).
142. Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994). At times, disclaimers like the one in Kline
will serve to insulate the law firm from liability. See Fortson v. Winstead, 961 F.2d 469, 475 (4th Cir. 1992).
143. Kline, 24 F.3d at 486 (quoting Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1985)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
144. Id.
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the law firm for assisting the thrift in making several private placements when it
knew that the thrift had fraudulently overvalued assets and embezzled funds. 14 5
To establish knowledge, the suit alleged that the law firm ignored facts that ought
to have led it to question the legality of its client's conduct. Lawyers at
O'Melveny knew that the auditors and outside law firm had recently resigned, but
failed to question the former auditors, law firm, the thrift regulators, or the
association's financial officer about the status of its client before issuing opinions
and engaging in other work that assisted in procuring investors for the thrift.
O'Melveny claimed that it owed no duty to investors to uncover the fraud. The
Ninth Circuit held that a law firm cannot rely solely on its client's representations
in rendering an opinion in connection with an offering, but must conduct its own

investigation. 14 6
In FDICv. Clark, the Tenth Circuit similarly upheld a claim against an outside
law firm for failing to investigate signs that its client was involved in
misconduct.14 7 The management of a bank had committed a fraud by securing a
series of unauthorized loans through the bank. The receiver of the failed bank
sued outside counsel for failing to investigate allegations made in a lawsuit that
the president had conspired to defraud the bank through these loans. The law firm
relied on the president's explanation and did not report the allegations to the
board of directors or investigate the claims any further. Relying in part on
O'Melveny, the court found that the lawyers were negligent in failing to
investigate the allegations.14 8
D. REGULATORY SANCTIONS
In addition to civil and criminal liability, courts and the SEC can sanction
lawyers for abuses regardless of whether the conduct would constitute a violation
under the appropriate ethical rules.149 Especially in the context of discovery
abuses, courts seem unwilling to excuse lawyers for relying on their clients'
representations and turning a blind eye to evidence that might be relevant.
In a recent case, the court sanctioned outside counsel for Qualcomm for failing

145. See FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992).
146. See id. at 748. The court explained that the firm had no obligation to "ferret out fraud" but did have to
make a "reasonable independent investigation." Id. The savings and loan association hired O'Melveny to
perform due diligence to confirm the accuracy of statements made in its private placement memoranda. Several
courts have distinguished O'Melveny by arguing that the lawyers were engaged for more limited purposes. See
Black, supra note 138, at 102-03.
147. See FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1545-50 (10th Cir. 1992).
148. See id. at 1549-50. Some other courts have taken the opposite position in third party liability cases as
opposed to malpractice cases, reasoning that lawyers have no duty to correct misstatements to third parties. So,
for instance, the court in Schatz v. Rosenberg held that a lawyer for a seller was not liable for forwarding a
financial statement he knew to be false to a buyer. See Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 490 (4th Cir. 1991).
149. See FED R. CIv. P. 11, 37,26(g); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,44-45 (1991) (acknowledging
the federal courts' inherent power to manage their courtrooms and cases).
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to search an employee's computer for e-mails responsive to a discovery
request.150 During the discovery process in a patent infringement suit, attorneys
for Qualcomm had information that ought to have led them to suspect that an
employee had relevant and responsive information on his computer. The lawyers
neglected to search that employee's computer nonetheless. During trial, an
associate stumbled upon a relevant e-mail from that employee, which Qualcomm
lawyers had not turned over. 151 The court found that the attorneys
chose not to look in the correct locations for the correct documents, to accept
unsubstantiated assurances of an important client that its search was sufficient,
to ignore the warning signs that the document search and production were
inadequate, not to press Qualcomm employees for the truth, and/or to
encourage employees to provide the information ... that Qualcomm needed
to ... succeed in the lawsuit.' 5 2
The court awarded Broadcom attorneys' fees and costs of over eight million
dollars and referred Qualcomm's attorneys to the State Bar of California to
investigate the potential ethical abuses. 15 3
Conduct that might arguably be considered appropriate, aggressive advocacy
in the context of legal ethics exposes lawyers to a substantial risk of civil and
criminal liability, as well as court sanctions. The disjuncture is confusing to
lawyers and sends a message that the organized bar is unconcerned about the
impact of its constituents' actions on third parties. This message is damaging to
the reputation of lawyers and reinforces the perception that they are unprincipled
in their dedication to the interests of their clients without regard to the impact that
their clients' actions may have on third parties and the public as a whole.
Again, as courts and other regulatory bodies step in to control the conduct of
lawyers, the bar risks its own obsolescence by failing to participate in this
endeavor.
IV. RESOLVING CONFLICT BETWEEN BODIEs REGULATING LAWYER
CONDUCT
Navigating the world of civil and criminal liability of lawyers can be
difficult. Countless scholars have argued without much controversy that the
law is unclear and the consequences of conduct uncertain. The law governing
lawyers' conduct in these cases, however, does not exist in a vacuum. It
interacts in complex ways with the ABA's Model Rules of Professional

* 150. See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cvl958-B (BLM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 911 (S.D.
Jan. 7, 2008).
151. See id. at *6-22.
152. Id. at *45.
153. See id. at *61-64.
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Conduct and state ethical rules. 15 4 In the context of securities and other
corporate fraud, scholars have argued that the ethical rules have encouraged
corporate lawyers to serve as mindless servants to senior managers.1 55 In
regard to the definition of knowledge, Susan Koniak has specifically
commented that the trigger for the lawyer to act generally occurs when the
lawyer "knows" that his client is engaged in fraud. Lawyers, however, are
conditioned to believe the managers of their corporate clients so they rarely, if
ever, "know" that something illegal has occurred.1 5 6
Professor Peter Kostant has persuasively suggested that the case law has
followed the lead of ethical rules. Prior to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the 1908 Canons and the 1970 Model Code recognized that lawyers
had a duty to rectify client fraud if the lawyer's services had been used in
connection with the conduct, while the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct
adopted in 1983 abandoned such obligations.1 57 The courts, Kostant argues,
have followed suit, reversing their prior understanding that the attorneys
cannot escape liability for client fraud by professing ignorance or passivity.i1s In Schatz v. Rosenberg, a widely cited case, the Fourth Circuit ruled
that lawyers, unlike all other-agents, can knowingly transmit false information to third parties.1 59 The tides have turned since 1991. The corporate
scandals of 2002 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have helped to correct and alter
the legal landscape but the ethical rules refuse to make this new commitment
explicit. As long as they do so, the bar can hide behind client loyalty.
In the past few decades at least, the bar has clung to a vision of lawyers as
partisans and advocates for their clients' autonomy. Courts, legislatures, and
regulators on the other hand, have to varying degrees grown to expect
attorneys to pursue socially useful ends.' 6 0 In the context of financial fraud,
public authorities have periodically required lawyers to help police wrongdoing and secure transparency in the markets. 161 Given the current financial
climate, it seems likely that courts, legislatures, and regulators will demand
an even greater partnership from attorneys. By dragging its feet and clinging
to the partisan model of lawyering in the face of a contrary trend, the bar risks
rendering itself irrelevant, at least in the context of corporate fraud and client
154. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, PermissiveRules of ProfessionalConduct, 91 MiNN. L. REv. 265,
314-25 (2006).
155. See Peter Kostant, Sarbanes-Oxley andthe Changing Norms of CorporateLawyering, 2004 MICH. ST.
L. REV 541, 544 (2004); Gordon, supra note 4, at 1188-90; William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The
Lawyer'sDuty of Candorand the Bar's Temptations of Evasion andApology, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 243, 264
(1998).
156. Koniak, supra note 56, at 1247.
157. Kostant, supranote 155, at 546-47.
158. See id. at 547.
159. See Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
160. See Wilkins, supra note 96, at 863.
161. See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET. AL., THE LAW AND ETHics OF LAWYERING (4th ed. 2005).
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crimes. One way the ABA can embrace a more complex role for lawyers in the
American system is by explicitly forbidding them from avoiding their
accepted public function by remaining willfully ignorant of their clients'
wrongdoing.
Regulators have historically interpreted the substantive obligations of
lawyers differently from the profession. For years, ethics scholars have
debated how to approach this divide. In an important article, Professor Susan
Koniak argues that this divergence in visions of the substantive obligations of
lawyers is evidence that the practicing bar, the courts, and other regulators
have different conceptions of- the law and different visions of the role of
lawyers in the system. 16 2 Others have disagreed, arguing the courts are
merely elaborating on the inevitable discretion lawyers must bring to bear in
particular factual settings.16 3 While this congenial interpretive exchange
between the courts and the bar may occur from time to time, the divergence in
definitions of knowledge supports Koniak's original position. The disagreement over the proper standards governing lawyers can and does at times
reflect a broader disagreement over the meaning of the law and the role
lawyers ought to play in society.
Here, courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies are insisting that
lawyers act as regulators by refusing to accept their clients' version of -events
when it is obviously distorted. The legal profession, however, adheres to the
partisan approach even if it requires mental contortion to avoid knowledge that
might impair zealous advocacy. This produces precisely the kind of normative
ambiguity that Koniak describes. 1 " Faced with the conflicting directives and the
weak or intermittent commitment of courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies, lawyers will cling to their own vision.16 5 This threatens to expose
lawyers to periodic liability as the government chooses to assert its own contrary
vision. More importantly, it impairs the deterrent effect of such liability and
leaves the public largely unprotected.
Critics of external regulation of the profession argue that the cost to
independence is too great. They note that lawyers are supposed to be
independent of the state in order to protect citizens from aggressive
government intrusion, and argue that allowing the government to regulate
lawyers undermines this form of independence. 16 6 As David Wilkins and
others have pointed out, however, independence is a complex notion. It means

162. See Susan Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389, 1390-92 (1992).
163. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, ReconceptualizingAdvocacy Ethics, 74 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1,
57-59 (2005); Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 327, 330 (1998).
164. See Koniak, supra note 162, at 1390.
165. See id.
166. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some
Possibilities,1986 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 613, 617-19 (1986).
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not only independence from government entities but also independence from
clients' whims. Lawyers theoretically ought to have enough distance from
their clients (or agents of their client) to resist demands that undermine the
law's fundamental purpose or the stability and integrity of the legal
framework. 16 ' Given the context of most representations, especially in the
case of corporate clients, the market incentive is toward a client-centered
approach. To protect the integrity of the legal system and the substance of
legal commands, the bar ought to defer to other regulatory bodies to balance
that incentive with the proper regard for the purposes of the law and the
integrity of the legal framework.
The bar's reluctance to embrace the willful ignorance standard offers
evidence that the organized bar is committed to its powerful corporate clients
while simultaneously being concerned about projecting an image of a public
profession committed to communal values. Scholars have long debated the
motives of the organized bar. Some argue that the bar, especially the corporate
bar, is a tool of its powerful clients and seeks to strengthen the power and
prerogative of a corporate elite.16 8 Others suggest that the bar's efforts at law
reform are designed to ward off greater regulation. Thus the bar makes
gestures at a public function without altering the nature of legal practice.1 6 9 In
a recent article on the role of tax lawyers, Tanina Rostain argues that the bar is
more interested in reinforcing the professional authority of elite tax lawyers
than appeasing its clients.170 The bar's persistent refusal to adopt a willful
ignorance standard, except when reacting to threats of more extensive
external regulation, confirms that at least in this instance, the bar is acting to
ward off greater regulation by making a nod toward its public function
without in fact altering the zealous nature of its constituents' practice. In
doing so, it protects powerful clients while simultaneously preserving the
image of the profession as devoted to the public interest. While this seems
like a cynical interpretation, there is no reason to assume that members of the
organized bar are not in fact committed to the image they seek to portray. 17 1
The actual knowledge standard, in some ways, allows this contradictory
dedication to powerful corporate interests and a public spirit to coexist in an

167. See Wilkins, supra note 96, at 853-72; Gordon, supra note 78, at 13.
168. See JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 35-37

(Oxford University Press) (1976).
169. See Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The OrganizedTax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE
J. ON REG. 77, 80-81 (2006) (describing the various interpretations of bar's motivation).
170. See id.
171. As Professor Rostain points out, many scholars have offered evidence that the bar is in fact dedicated to
democratic values and is not entirely self-interested. See id. at 81 n.13 (citing TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND
MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 3 (1987) and Robert W. Gordon, The

Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasiesand Practicesof New York City Lawyers 1870-1910, in THE NEW
HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIvIL WAR AMERICA 51 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984)).
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uneasy tension.
The tension, however, breeds a kind of hypocrisy and suppresses a debate
over when the client service model ought to give way to other values, at least
in the context of certain areas of practice. The actual knowledge standard
serves to mask the fundamental disagreement. It papers over the real issues by
allowing the profession to articulate and publicly espouse a devotion to
communal ends while in reality encouraging lawyers to pursue the interests of
their clients without regard to the consequences. If, as scholars like Professor
David Wilkins have argued, enforcement proceedings provide a moment to
discuss and debate the proper role of lawyers in society, then people on both
sides of the debate over the proper role for lawyers ought to embrace that
arena. 17 2 The knowledge requirement, however, obscures the conflict. For
instance, by tacitly encouraging defense lawyers to avoid the truth so as to
allow them to put untruthful clients on the stand, the profession has buried the
real question about whether we ought to allow lawyers in some contexts to
present false evidence.
Because market forces encourage lawyers to capitulate in client demands,
the psychological tendency toward deliberate ignorance is even greater than it
might otherwise be. 173 Richard Posner argues that as the demand for lawyers
has increased over the course of the last century, the number of lawyers also
expanded. The greater demand was met by increased competition amongst
lawyers for the prized clients. The competitive market for legal services
reinforced the ethical or fiduciary duty toward clients while simultaneously
undermining any sense of responsibility to the court or community. 1 7 4
Historians have similarly argued that the nature of practice in the late
nineteenth century offered some insulation from market pressures. The
increase in corporate clients and the shift in practice from the courtroom to
the boardroom similarly affected the public orientation of the profession.17 5
The bar's unwillingness to impose sanctions on lawyers who avoid duties to
the public by remaining willfully ignorant of their clients' conduct reinforces
this trend.
In addition to allowing the bar to entertain a commitment to public service

172. See Wilkins, supra note 96, at 884-85.
173. See RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 63-68 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
174. See id.
175. See Gordon, supra note 171, at 51; Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The
Formationand Dissolutionof the Original Understandingof the Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
381, 397 (2001). Gordon, among others, expresses skepticism about what is known as the "declension
thesis"-the idea that the legal profession has declined from a golden moment in the past in which lawyers were
truly dedicated to a public purpose to its current state of total devotion to clients' selfish goals. See Gordon,
supranote 78, at 48-68; Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civil Republicanism: Interrogatingthe Ideology of
Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1397, 1398-1400 (2003). At the same time, they recognize that
the myth of decline is based on some factual reality. See Gordon,supra note 78, at 51.
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while tacitly allowing it to erode in practice, the bar's continuous fight with
the government over lawyer regulation might take a different form were the
bar forced to acknowledge the increasingly relevant distinctions between
different sorts of practicing lawyers. The bar might be more willing to revisit
the proper relationship between client loyalty and service to the public and
legal system in discrete contexts.
CONCLUSION
There are no compelling reasons to treat lawyers with greater leniency than
other individuals under the criminal law. In crafting a definition of knowledge
under criminal law, courts and scholars had to grapple with due process
concerns. We do put people in prison for remaining willfully ignorant of
certain facts. Given that the stakes are so much lower and the concerns more
prosaic, the disciplinary rules should not employ a more limited definition of
knowledge. It is hard to know at the outset of a representation whether
ignoring obvious facts will actually benefit or harm the client. The rules
should work to discourage such deliberate ignorance. Doing so will help
harmonize the rules protecting the public, third parties, and the integrity of
the justice system with rules regarding privilege and confidentiality. It will
help strengthen the positive and socially beneficial aspects of the attorneyclient relationship while, at least theoretically, discouraging the destructive
manipulation of the lawyer's role.
The notion that lawyers will no longer be able to close their eyes to obvious
signs of wrongdoing will also strengthen the role of the business lawyer. It
will help clarify his obligations to the managers or representatives of his
client and the client itself. While it is a difficult, often impossible, task to
determine the best interests of a corporate client, the business lawyer must do
so, at times, without substituting the opinion of the managers for that of the
organization. In order to determine when the managers are no longer
trustworthy and to make the difficult calculation of the client's interest, a
lawyer needs full information. There is no hope for making this calculation if
the lawyer has blinded himself to important facts. Thus, proscribing willful
ignorance is critical not only to help prevent lawyers from becoming pawns in
a corporate fraud but also to ensure that lawyers are serving the client as a
whole rather than merely the sometimes distorted view of its current
representatives.
As Professor Luban has pointed out, there may be serious repercussions of
a willful ignorance standard for criminal defense lawyers. Defense attorneys
rely on the actual knowledge standard to put their clients on the stand even
when their testimony is highly doubtful. There are two responses to this
concern. First, perhaps it would be good to revisit the question of how tolerant
we ought to be of perjury when it comes from a criminal defendant. Forcing
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lawyers to pursue suspicious facts may well trigger a more direct and
productive conversation over the proper role of criminal defense lawyers in
this regard. Second, the rules have been read to apply differently in different
contexts. Criminal defense attorneys are frequently treated differently. There
is no reason why this rule couldn't be applied with equal sensitivity to
context.
The bar has consistently relied on different applications of the actual
knowledge standard to make real distinctions between different sorts of
lawyers engaged in differentsorts of practice. By doing so, it can maintain
one set of substantive standards that seemingly apply equally to all lawyers.
Thus, the use of actual knowledge not only stifles a debate on the proper role
of lawyers in a democratic system, it also perpetuates a myth that there is one
profession. In addition to bringing the debate over the proper balance between
client loyalty and public service to the surface, adopting a willful ignorance
standard might force the bar to revisit its assumption that there is one
profession subject to one set of uniform standards.

